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The current paper provides an analytic overview of the history of 
monetary policy in Korea, since the founding of the Bank of Korea in 
June 1950 through the spring of 2010. In light of the dramatic socio- 
economic transformation over this period, the 60 years are divided 
into four phases, which provided a different environment for the con- 
duct of monetary policy. An organizing analytical framework is pro- 
posed for each phase, with the hope of facilitating further research. 
Keywords: Inflation, Liberalization, Small open economy  
JEL Classification: E4, E5, F4
I. Introduction
The Bank of Korea (hereinafter denoted as “BOK” or “the Bank”) was 
established as the central bank of the young Republic of Korea in June 
1950. In the same month, the Korean War broke out, which devastated 
the country socially and economically for the next three years. After much 
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subsequent political turmoil in the ashes of war, the Korean economy 
began to stage a remarkable growth that continued for four decades, land- 
ing Korea in the group of advanced economies in many international 
classifications by the 2000s (e.g., World Economic Outlook or World 
Development Indicators). 
Considering the weight of the socio-economic drama in these 60 years, 
it is plainly an audacious, if not quixotic, attempt to canvass the mon- 
etary policy of the BOK in some 20 pages. We thus make no claim to 
being able to do full justice to its dynamic history, but instead attempt 
what might be called a helicopter tour, borrowing from the familiar rhet- 
oric for central bank’s monetary policy. Without attempting to provide a 
full documentary, we seek to offer organizing themes of various phases 
of the first 60 years in light of simple macroeconomic frameworks. 
There are several reasons for our approach. The full details of history
―which cannot be covered in a paper like this―have been documented 
in several excellent books.1 We hope to contribute a complementary an- 
alysis of these impressive 60 years by identifying conceptual frameworks 
that capture key macroeconomic characteristics of several different phases 
through which the Korean economy and macroeconomic policy have mor- 
phed during the past six decades. In so doing, we hope to invite further 
macroeconomic analysis of Korea’s policy and development experience, 
which may also provide lessons for countries in the early stage of their 
own development trajectory. At the same time, we hope to distill lessons 
for the current and future challenges for the monetary policy of the BOK, 
as it enters its next 60 years. 
Our overall view of Korean monetary policy is positive. During the first 
three decades, monetary policy was constrained by historical and eco- 
nomic circumstances of the time. Except for the very early years include- 
ing war time, however, monetary policy avoided the worst form of fiscal 
dominance. Despite long periods of high inflation and financial repres- 
sion, the Korean economy stayed clear of a severe wage-price spiral, or 
more generally, the bind of what the late Dornbusch (1996) called the 
“Latin Triangle.” A decade-long liberalization met with a crash in the late 
1990s, but the subsequent recovery was fast and strong. Additionally, 
over the most recent decade of inflation targeting, monetary policy pro- 
vided a steady anchor befitting an industrialized economy that is inte- 
1 For a detailed account of Korea’s financial development (including the role of 
the central bank), see Cole and Park (1983), Woo (1991), and Hoshi, Kim, and Park 
(2010).
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grated with the global economy in real and financial terms. 
This positive view is not to look away from formidable challenges that 
remain. As was made clear during the global crisis over the last two 
years, Korea remains vulnerable to the vagary of international capital 
flows, which poses a tough challenge for economic policy at large and 
monetary policy in particular.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the section that im- 
mediately follows, we offer a brief overview of history and introduce our 
definition of four different economic phases. Subsequent sections discuss 
these four phases in greater detail, followed by the penultimate section 
that discusses the last two years, which warrant a special discussion. A 
short conclusion wraps up the paper. 
II. Overview of History
We divide the past 60 years into four periods that had different eco- 
nomic environments for the conduct of monetary policy. Each period had 
a defining macroeconomic characteristic, which reflects the historical 
and economic situation of the time. We name the four periods according 
to those characteristics as follows. 
War and Its Aftermath, 1950-1962/1965
Big Push, 1962/1965-1983/1985
Liberalization, 1983/1985-1998
Open Macro-economy, since 1999
Our motivation for this division is illustrated in Figure 1. Its four 
panels show: (1) inflation and fiscal deficit; (2) growth and inflation; (3) 
money multipliers; and (4) exchange rates (nominal and real values 
against the U.S. dollar). These are all annual data, obtained from the 
BOK publications (BOK 2005) for the early years. To describe the data 
in some detail, they are the CPI inflation rate, fiscal deficit in percent of 
GDP, growth rate of real GDP, money multipliers as ratios of M1 and 
M2 over the base money, and nominal and real exchange rates of the 
Korean Won relative to the U.S. dollar. 
The defining characteristic of the first period is the monetization of the 
large fiscal deficit. During the war years (1950-1953) and their aftermath, 
fiscal deficits remained high, and the central bank seigniorage could not 
help being a source of government finance for much of this period. As 
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FIGURE 1
OVERVIEW
monetary policy was constrained by fiscal needs, the inflation rate was 
very high, reaching high double digits in several years. 
The second period marked the start of the four decades of high eco- 
nomic growth, but the inflation rate remained moderately high, staying 
in double digits in many years. We name this to be the period of Big Push 
(Gerschenkron 1962), as the economic growth took off under the nation- 
wide economic mobilization program. Within the mobilization program, 
the central bank was called on to play an important role in development 
financing, again constraining the conduct of monetary policy. As a result, 
inflation rate remained high, and several sizable devaluations occurred. 
The third period was characterized by the liberalization of the financial 
system, and was accompanied by inflation rates lower than in earlier 
decades. The low inflation reflected both the receding constraint on mon- 
etary policy and the global low inflation environment since the early 
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1980s following the Volcker disinflation. The macroeconomic consequence 
of financial liberalization showed up clearly in money multipliers. The 
ratios of M1 and M2 to the base money began to rise in this period, 
following two decades of little change. The pace of liberalization was gra- 
dual for most of the period, but turned into a shock liberalization fol- 
lowing the Asian crisis in 1997.  
The fourth period had all the trappings of an open macro-economy in- 
tegrated into the global financial system, coming after the shock liberal- 
ization during the Asian crisis (Fischer 2003). One visible consequence 
was the increase in the exchange rate flexibility. Inflation targeting was 
adopted as the mode of monetary policy and the call rate was adopted 
as the instrument, giving closure to nearly five decades of targeting money 
supply. Monetary policy was conducted under the inflation-targeting re- 
gime, and the inflation rate remained stable. The tail end of this period 
was punctuated by the global financial crisis and the Great Recession 
since the late 2008.  
We will go over each period in the sections that follow, and devote a 
separate section to the 2008-2009 period of the Great Recession, which 
posed a significant challenge to the macroeconomic and monetary policy 
of Korea. 
III. War and Its Aftermath 
A. Chronology (1950-1964)
The Bank of Korea was established as the central bank of Korea in 
June 1950.2 Its Monetary Board was given the legal authority to decide 
on monetary policy operations. 
Its early years were saddled with turmoil. The Bank started with bur- 
dens inherited from the five-year confusion following the withdrawal of 
the Japanese colonial government in 1945. On top of it all, the Korean 
War broke out in June 1950, in the same month as the founding of the 
Bank. The war ravaged the country for three years, claiming large human 
and material costs. The fiscal burden of war and subsequent political 
turmoil severely limited room for monetary policy. 
There was a short-lived attempt at bank privatization that lasted six 
years. In the 1956 bank privatization, the majority stakes that the govern- 
2 The BOK was transformed from the Bank of Chosun of the colonial period, 
which in turn had originated from the Bank of Korea established under the last 
monarchy.
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FIGURE 2
DEFICIT AND SEIGNIORAGE
ment had held in commercial banks were sold to the private sector. How- 
ever, the solution resulted in a large concentration of ownership among 
a few investors. These banks, however, were re-nationalized in 1962 amid 
sweeping financial sector reform that tightened the government control 
of the financial system. The power of the central bank was also cur- 
tailed by the revision of the Bank of Korea law in 1962, which placed 
the central bank under the influence of the Minister of Finance as the 
coordinator of economic policies. 
B. Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
From the viewpoint of monetary policy, this period was characterized 
by “the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” (Sargent and Wallace 1981), 
with high inflation following the inevitable monetization of the large fiscal 
deficit. Figure 2 shows the fiscal deficit and seigniorage in percent of 
GDP since 1953 when we have the data; the correlation between the two 
is clear. Over the post-war part of the 1950s (1953-1960), fiscal deficit 
was 23 percent of GDP and seigniorage 3 percent of GDP on average. 
Seigniorage thus financed more than 10 percent of fiscal deficit on 
average, contributing to the average annual inflation rate of 26 percent 
over the same period (Table 1). 
One of the most important macroeconomic challenges of this time was 
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DEFICIT, SEIGNIORAGE, AND INFLATION
the stabilization from a very high inflation, a challenge that was experi- 
enced by many countries in various points in their economic history. In 
the late 1950s, the annual financial stabilization program― to be dis- 
cussed further in the next section―was adopted to control inflation. 
The program imposed ceilings on the expansion of money supply and 
credit. This period also included a currency reform in 1962, although 
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the results were unsatisfactory. By the mid-1960s, the inflation rate came 




In 1965, three years after the initiation of the massive mobilization 
program, the government loosened the control and repression of the 
financial system. It raised interest rates substantially, for example, one- 
year term deposit rate rose from 15 to 30 percent overnight. A notable 
input to this reform was the recommendations of Shaw (1973).
Nevertheless, the need for development financing was the defining 
factor for financial development during this phase. The government of- 
fered implicit or explicit guarantees for foreign borrowing, and interest 
rates on many policy loans, including exports, were maintained at low 
levels despite the 1965 liberalization of interest rates. The resulting dual 
structure in the allocation of loans led to an expansion in the informal 
credit market (curb market). 
Several attempts to develop financial markets garnered limited success, 
when the priority remained squarely on financing economic development. 
In the late 1960s, the government established several special-purpose 
banks, and made attempts to facilitate equity market, with little success. 
In 1972, the government announced an emergency measure, which in- 
cluded a moratorium on all loans in the curb market. During the rest 
of the 1970s, the government made several attempts to facilitate the de- 
velopment of the equity market, but again with little success. 
Overall, the government was deeply involved in economic mobilization 
and management. A telling example of the extent of its involvement were 
two monthly meetings attended by the president and business leaders, 
intended to discuss economic trends and export performance, respec- 
tively. Between 1965 and 1979 (when President Park was assassinated), 
298 such meetings were held (Hoshi et al. 2009). 
B. Dual Financial Markets— Financial Repression and Fiscal 
Dominance Lite 
Despite some loosening in the government control of the financial sys- 
tem in 1965, the financial system remained relatively repressed until a 
more comprehensive liberalization started in the early 1980s. In the 
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0.65 0.72 0.71 0.45 0.64
Note: Sample period is 1985Q1-1996Q4.
TABLE 2
MONETARY REGRESSIONS, LIBERALIZATION 
meantime, one conspicuous outcome of government involvement was the 
large size of directed credit and a consequent expansion in the curb 
market. 
The central bank was a critical part of the directed credit flows. All 
domestic banks were required to provide policy loans, and the directed 
credit accounted for more than 50 percent of total bank loans through 
the 1980s (Kim 2008, Table 10). Additionally, the BOK provided signifi- 
cant support for these policy loans. In the case of export loans, for ex- 
ample, the BOK provided support for about two-thirds of export loans 
extended by commercial banks over the 1966-1986 period (Box 1 from 
Cho and Kim 1995). 
Thus, seigniorage played a sizable role in the directed credit program, 
although not in financing government deficit (Giovannini and De Melo 
1993). This was not a classic case of fiscal dominance, but probably a 
softer case of quasi-fiscal dominance, where monetary policy was con- 
strained by the need to finance the state-led drive for economic devel- 
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0.77 0.85 0.87 0.71 0.80
Note: Sample period is 1999Q1-2008Q4.
TABLE 3
MONETARY REGRESSIONS, OPEN ECONOMY
opment. It was financial repression not for government financing, but for 
state-led development financing. 
The dual credit market, a symptom of financial repression, was evident 
in parallel interest rates that existed in formal and informal credit mar- 
kets. Policy loans were provided at a much lower interest rate than gen- 
eral loans. The interest rate gap averaged about 10 percentage points 
during most of this period, until it began to narrow in the early 1980s 
(Table 3 from Cho and Kim 1995). A natural consequence was the ex- 
pansion of the curb market, which was estimated to account for about 
80 percent of M1 at the time. Moreover, the interest rates in the curb 
market were estimated to have exceeded the interest rate on general 
bank loans by more than 20 percentage points during most of this period, 
until the interest rate gap began to narrow in the 1980s.
The monetary policy of this period is best understood as the combined 
action of the BOK and the Ministry of Finance. The emphasis was clearly 
on economic growth, with secondary regard for maintaining low inflation. 
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A telling description can be found in Cole and Park (1983). Under the 
financial stabilization program that defined the perimeter of monetary 
policy, the planners estimated the demand for M1 and M2. Once the 
decision was made on the “acceptable” level of M2, then the “accept- 
able” level of domestic credit growth was derived. In the “allocation” of 
this acceptable level of credit, strategic sectors received preferential treat- 
ment.
One clear achievement of this period was economic take-off, with the 
growth rate in real GDP averaging more than 8 percent per year over 
the two decades since 1965. Under this environment where economic 
development was the top priority of macroeconomic policies, we can still 
attempt to assess the performance of monetary policy in a limited sense. 
Was the inflation rate of this period higher than was desirable, thereby 
possibly detracting from growth that could have been even stronger? 
Otherwise, could the same or similar levels of growth rate have been com- 
patible with a lower rate of inflation? 
This question goes beyond the boundary of conventional inflation-output 
trade-off that is the usual focus of monetary policy analysis― the in- 
flationary consequence of the deviation of output from a trend growth 
rate. Instead, this question pertains to a less understood relationship 
between inflation and long-term (trend) growth itself. The literature on 
growth and inflation suggests that excessive inflation is detrimental to 
growth― a very high inflation (exceeding 20 percent) has been associ- 
ated with lower growth rate (Barro 1998). Such excessive inflation was 
avoided, given that no explosion in inflation occurred. However, inflation 
rates were on the high side, and exceeded 20 percent in several years 
in the early 1980s. Inflation rates declined to low single digits only in the 
mid-1980s, accompanied by a decline in seigniorage (Figure 3). High in- 
flation rates for the most of this period― again, although not explosive
― leave open the question of whether a lower inflation could have been 
compatible with the high growth rate of this period. 
We turn to the foreign exchange market for suggestive evidence relating 
to this question. Starting with the real exchange rates relative to two 
major trading partners, the United States and Japan, we do not observe 
an appreciating trend during this period, despite a continued increase 
in the per capita income relative to the U.S., which would have been 
closely correlated with labor productivity increases (Figure 4). Turning 
to the nominal exchange rates, we can see several episodes of nominal 
devaluation during this period. These movements in the real and nominal 
exchange rates suggest that inflation was running ahead of productivity 
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FIGURE 3
SEIGNIORAGE AND INFLATION SINCE 1965
increase, more than what the Balassa-Samuelson effect could account 
for, thereby leading to devaluations to prevent the real exchange rate from 
appreciating to a level that undermines the external competitiveness 
and thus, export-based development strategy. 
V. Liberalization
A. Chronology (1985-1998)
The government began to privatize banks gradually in the early 1980s. 
By 1985, all commercial banks were privatized, although still under the 
administrative control of the government. In 1989, Korea Foreign Ex- 
change Bank was privatized, as the first case of privatizing a special- 
purpose bank. 
The liberalization of interest rates also started in the early 1980s. 
Several attempts were made to liberalize interest rates, including by 
phasing out preferential interest rates on policy loans. Nevertheless, bank 
interest rates were subject to government control, until a more extensive 
liberalization was put in place in the 1990s. In 1991, the government 
established a multi-year plan to liberalize interest rates, which aimed at 
liberalizing long-term rates ahead of short-term rates, and bank interest 
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FIGURE 4
EXCHANGE RATES RELATIVE TO THE U.S. AND JAPAN 
rates ahead of securities market rates. 
The actual interest rate liberalizations in the 1990s, however, deviated 
from the original plan, and short-term interest rates (including on de- 
posits of non-bank financial institutions) were liberalized ahead of interest 
rates on time deposits of commercial banks. This fuelled the growth of 
non-bank financial institutions, and their deposits far exceeded those of 
commercial banks in the early 1990s (Hoshi, Kim, and Park 2010). 
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The liberalization of international capital flows also proceeded gradually 
during this period, picking up speed in the mid-1990s. One important 
development was the 1994 lifting of the ceiling on short-term foreign cur- 
rency borrowings by banks, while maintaining the ceiling on longer-term 
borrowings. Capital inflows picked up significantly in the 1994-1996 
period. 
The liberalization period concluded with an unintended consequence. 
The currency crisis that swept through Asia in 1997 hit Korea as well, 
forcing a sharp economic adjustment. The crisis had the consequence of 
bringing about shock liberalization, largely completing the macroeconomic 
liberalization of the Korean economy by 1998. Interest rates were fully 
liberalized and the exchange rate, which had earlier been allowed to 
fluctuate within a band, was fully floated at the peak of the crisis in 
December 1997.
B. Liberalization and Transition
The outcome of gradual liberalization can be seen in two derived sta- 
tistics: the velocity and money multipliers. In Figure 5, the velocities for 
M1 and M2 begin to fall distinctively in this period. Money multipliers 
(M1 and M2 over M0) begin to rise, as illustrated in both Figures 1 and 5. 
The directed credit program began to decline in size in the early 1990s, 
and was largely channeled to small and medium-sized firms―as opposed 
to larger corporations that used to be the main recipients― since the 
mid-1990s (Kim 2008). 
In the middle of ongoing changes in economic environment, the BOK 
appears to have conducted monetary policy to keep inflation pressure at 
bay. We base this inference on several regressions that relate to different 
aspects of monetary policy. The first equation, motivated by the Taylor 
rule ( Taylor 1993; Walsh 1998), regresses a short-term interest rate (call 
rate) on the CPI inflation rate and GDP growth rate in quarterly fre- 
quency. The same regression was also estimated, replacing the GDP 
growth rate with the output gap, which was calculated as the difference 
between the actual output and the trend output (Hodrick-Prescott fil- 
tered). 
Irate＝constant＋a*irate(－1Q)＋b*inf＋c*(growth rate or output gap) 
This equation is intended to summarize the observed outcome of mon- 
etary policy, rather than the actual monetary policy rule or conduct. 
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FIGURE 5
VELOCITIES AND MULTIPLIERS
Monetary policy was under a regime of monetary targeting until 1998, 
and the call rate used in our regression was not a target or instrument 
of monetary policy during this period. Moreover, we are not using the 
deviation of inflation from its target value. 
The regression (Table 2) nevertheless shows that the short-term interest 
rate rose more than the inflation rate, implying that the monetary policy 
affected interest rates in the direction of mitigating inflation pressure. 
At the same time, the coefficient on output growth is not statistically 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS510
significant. One possible explanation is that monetary policy was target- 
ing money supply, in an environment where many interest rates were 
still being gradually liberalized. As a result, anti-cyclical adjustment in 
money supply might not have appeared visibly in the short-term interest 
rate. Another explanation is that monetary policy was providing full am- 
munition to growth until inflation pressure kicked in, thereby leaving 
little room for anti-cyclical adjustment in monetary policy stance. 
On the external side, the real exchange rate shows positive association 
with relative productivity growth. We regress the bilateral real exchange 
rate relative to the United States (the primary trading partner of this 
period) on the global oil price, productivity differential relative to the 
U.S., and short-term interest rate differential relative to the U.S. In a 
fully floating exchange rate regime, higher productivity growth would be 
associated with real appreciation, higher interest rate with real depre- 
ciation (via nominal depreciation in quarterly frequency), and high oil 
price with real depreciation (Korea being an oil-importing country).3
RER＝constant＋a*oil price＋b*productivity differential＋c*interest 
rate differential 
In the event, we find a statistically significant positive correlation bet- 
ween the real exchange rate and productivity differential. Although this 
might be viewed as a natural development to be expected of an economy 
growing at the pace of Korea, such positive correlation did not emerge 
in the earlier period (Figures 4 and 6). We interpreted the earlier lack of 
this positive correlation as the outcome of high inflation and occasional 
devaluations that followed. Furthermore, we interpret the positive cor- 
relation of this period as indicating increased macroeconomic stability, 
consistent with the inflation rate that was much lower than in earlier 
periods.
In an attempt to bring together the interaction of monetary policy with 
inflation, growth, and the exchange rate, we estimate a simple VAR 
model estimated in first-differenced logs. The four variables are the log 
changes in the real GDP, CPI, nominal exchange rate relative to the 
3 Nominal interest rates are used in this regression because they are closer to 
the instrument of monetary policy than real interest rates, and because price ri- 
gidities keep nominal and real interest rates highly correlated at quarterly fre- 
quency. Indeed, we obtain very similar coefficient estimates for interest rates (in 
both Tables 2 and 3), when we estimate this equation using real interest rates 
instead of nominal interest rates.
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FIGURE 6
REAL EXCHANGE RATE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND OIL PRICE
USD, and short-term interest rate. The interest rate equation is listed last 
in the system to improve the odds of identifying monetary policy shocks. 
Despite carrying little statistical significance, the results are broadly 
consistent with our discussion so far. Short-term interest rate rises in 
response to inflation rate with a lag of 4-6 quarters, but responds slight- 
ly to growth rates. On the outcome of monetary policy, shocks to short- 
term interest rate lead to a decline in growth rate with a lag, while hav- 
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FIGURE 7
VAR IMPULSE-RESPONSES, LIBERALIZATION PHASE
ing minor effects on the inflation rate and nominal exchange rate. 
C. Crash ― The Asian Crisis 
This liberalization phase concluded with a shock liberalization of the 
economy, following the currency crisis that erupted in 1997. The econ- 
omy made a quick transition to a small open economy that was fully 
integrated with the world financial market. The cost and benefit of the 
consequent acceleration of liberalization may be debated; however, the 
significant cost that the currency crisis exacted is out of the question. 
The macroeconomic policy during the crisis was much debated, for ex- 
ample, Coe and Kim (2002). 
From the viewpoint of monetary policy, we ask whether there were 
macroeconomic imbalances that could have been detected and, thus, 
countered by monetary policy in the lead-up to the 1997 currency crisis. 
Standard macroeconomic indicators do not appear to have spelled doom 
    OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF MONETARY POLICY IN KOREA 513
FIGURE 8
THE 1990S UNTIL THE CRISIS
in the years preceding the crisis (Figure 8). Inflation was not alarming, 
and equity and housing prices were moderating after having peaked early 
in the 1990s. Output growth was slowing, but not beyond the norm of 
a cyclical slowdown. 
Concern could have been raised about the current account deficit that 
kept rising, despite the slowing economy and sagging asset prices of the 
mid-1990s. A relatively weak real exchange rate might have helped mod- 
erate the current account deficit. Some econometric support for such an 
interpretation can be found in Lee (2009a) who applied a simple struc- 
tural VAR framework to the current account and real exchange rate for 
several Asian countries. In the mid-1990s, the Korean real exchange rate 
was influenced by positive transitory shocks that tended to appreciate 
the real exchange rate and deteriorate the current account balance.  
However, it is difficult to imagine that the full intensity of the crisis 
could have been foreseen on the basis of macroeconomic factors alone. 
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With the benefit of hindsight, we now understand the role played by the 
double hazard of maturity and currency mismatches, as well as the large 
role played by non-bank financial institutions. They have also been found 
important in many early warning models [see Kim (2006) for various 
early warning models applied to emerging markets, including Korea]. Al- 
though a significant refinement has been made to early warning models 
after the event, developing a sufficiently persuasive prognosis of crises 
has proven elusive. 
The build-up of vulnerability in the lightly regulated segment of the 
financial market has common threads with the experience during the 
2008 crisis, which we will discuss in Section VII. We close this section 
with the observation that the virulence of the Asian crisis was not to be 
expected from the conventional macroeconomic indicators observed before 
the crisis.
VI. Open Macro-Economy 
Following the shock liberalization of 1998 and the adoption of inflation 
targeting in 1999, the BOK monetary policy has been conducted in the 
direction of keeping expected inflation around its target, in an economic 
environment that has become more liberal and open than in any earlier 
period. The exchange rate regime has become sufficiently flexible, and 
the financial account regime has also been greatly liberalized. 
A. Inflation Targeting 
The main features of this period show up from the same econometric 
specifications that were used in the previous section. The coefficient 
estimates from the regressions of interest rate and exchange rate confirm 
that the monetary policy has been conducted under the framework of 
inflation targeting with flexible exchange rates. 
Starting with the regression of interest rate on inflation and growth, 
this equation now becomes a much better way of capturing the conduct 
of monetary policy, as the call rate has become the actual policy in- 
strument of the BOK. However, a regression on the current inflation rate 
is not the best way to capture the conduct of monetary policy under infla- 
tion targeting. To manage medium-term inflation and the expectation 
thereof, inflation-targeting central bank would adjust monetary policy in 
response to expected inflation. This suggests modifying the Taylor-rule 
regression by replacing the current inflation with expected inflation 
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(Clarida et al. 2000), although subject to the qualification that econo- 
metricians do not get to observe the expected inflation that formed the 
basis of monetary policy decisions. 
We estimate two sets of regressions, using the current and one-year 
ahead inflation rate on the right-hand side. Under inflation targeting, the 
coefficient on the expected inflation rate would come out more robust 
than the coefficient on the contemporaneous inflation rate. The equation 
with one-year-ahead inflation rate is estimated by GMM, using lagged 
variables as instruments.
Irate＝constant＋a*irate(－1Q)＋b*inf＋c*(growth rate or output gap)
Irate＝constant＋a*irate(－1Q)＋b*inf(＋4Q)＋c*(growth rate or output gap)
The estimation results indicate a clear change in the conduct of mon- 
etary policy (Table 3). When the contemporaneous inflation rate is used, 
the coefficient on inflation is numerically smaller than in the previous 
phase before inflation targeting was adopted, or altogether loses statistical 
significance in the specification with output gap. The coefficient on in- 
flation is thus less than one in both short term and long term, in clear 
contrast to the previous phase. When the lead inflation rate is used, the 
coefficient on inflation is both statistically significant and numerically 
large. The estimated coefficient implies that the long-run coefficient ex- 
ceeds one. Moreover, a similar equation estimated for the previous (liber- 
alization) phase produces coefficient estimates on lead inflation that are 
not statistically significant despite being numerically very large (compare 
with the last two columns of Table 2). We find this to indicate a clear 
change in the monetary policy operation to an inflation-targeting regime, 
where monetary policy stance is adjusted in response to expected infla- 
tion. 
While our estimation results suggest a change in the conduct of 
monetary policy between the liberalization phase and the open macro- 
economy phase, these results appear to be sensitive to the sample 
period. Shin (2007) found little evidence in favor of inflation targeting 
when the sample through 2005 was used, as well as including other 
variables such as the exchange rate. Our own equation also provides 
evidence in favor of inflation targeting when it is estimated over a longer 
sample that goes beyond 2006, and not for a shorter sample. We prefer 
to use the results based on a longer sample considering that there is a 
social learning curve when a new policy regime is adopted; however, the 
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FIGURE 9
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question awaits further research, including in the direction of Kim and 
Park (2006). Moreover, our results imply neither that BOK has paid at- 
tention only to inflation and growth, nor that inflation targeting is the 
optimal monetary policy regime for Korea. 
The increased flexibility of the economy in both internal and external 
sides emerges clearly in the real exchange rate regression. In comparison 
to earlier periods, we see not only the positive correlation between the 
real exchange rate and relative productivity, but also the negative cor- 
relation between the real exchange rate and interest rate differential. 
This negative coefficient suggests the growing influence of interest rate 
parity, an outcome of deepening liberalization in international financial 
flows.4
4 It should be noted that this negative coefficient does not constitute evidence 
in favor of the interest rate parity. Such a test requires a regression of expected 
nominal exchange rate change on the nominal interest rate differential. Further- 
more, the favorable evidence would require the coefficient on the interest rate 
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Figure 9 shows the impulse responses from the same VAR as in Figure 
7, estimated in log changes of the real GDP, CPI, nominal exchange 
rate relative to the U.S. dollar, and short-term interest rate. The interest 
rate equation is listed last in the system to improve the odds of iden- 
tifying monetary policy shocks. 
The results again carry low statistical significance, but indicate a visible 
change in the response of the short-term interest rate to inflation shocks. 
The interest rate is found to have decreased in response to shocks to 
inflation, with a lag of 4-6 quarters. This adds to the evidence for a 
change in the monetary policy conduct, which we discussed in Table 3. 
Shocks to short-term interest rates lead to a decline in output growth 
and a nominal depreciation. The effects are faster or stronger than during 
the liberalization phase, and the stronger response of the exchange rate 
to interest rate shocks is consistent with a greater flexibility of the ex- 
change rate in this phase. 
A few caveats are in order, however. This simple VAR estimation is a 
quick first pass at the data (hence, low statistical significance), and is 
in no way a substitute for a more structured investigation of macro- 
economic developments in this period. Indeed, more structured empirical 
investigations have been provided in many papers, including Kim and 
Park (2006) and DSGE papers. Our helicopter tour beckons further effort 
in this direction of applying the tools of macroeconomics to the study of 
Korean economy and macroeconomic policies. 
VII. Great Recession
About a decade since the currency crisis of 1997, the Korean economy 
was confronted with another large external shock in late 2008. The finan- 
cial flow reversed, with the large outflow being accompanied by a sharp 
depreciation in the exchange rate (Figure 10). Industrial production col- 
lapsed, stoking fears of another economic crisis. In the event, the situa- 
tion stabilized and a solid recovery started in 2009. In mid-2010, discus- 
sion shifted to the pace of withdrawing policy stimulus. However, the 
experience since 2008 has revealed a significant challenge for Korea’s 
macroeconomic and monetary policy. 
A. Global Crisis and Response in Korea 
We want to note first that, beyond the external movements in financial 
parity to be close to unity in magnitude.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS518
FIGURE 10
THE ASIAN CRISIS AND GREAT RECESSION, 1997-2009
flows and exchange rate, the experience since 2008 was markedly dif- 
ferent from that of the 1997-1998 crisis. The difference is clearly evident 
in several domestic economic indicators illustrated in Figure 10. As the 
most tangible indicator of the economic consequence of external shock, 
the unemployment rate increased since 2008 owing to the economic slow- 
down. However, the magnitude of increase pales next to the doubling of 
the unemployment rate during the Asian crisis. 
This difference is not necessarily because the size of external shock 
was that much smaller. Since the late 2008, the world economy experi- 
enced the most severe economic crisis since the 1930s, being aptly called 
the Great Recession. The global crisis was triggered by the freeze in the 
financial system in the fall of 2008, which transformed the financial 
crisis that had been continuing since 2007 into a global macroeconomic 
crisis. In 2009, the world output declined by more than half a percent 
and the world trade volume by 11 percent (WEO 2010). 
In the face of the global shock of this proportion, Korea as a trading 
nation could not escape the adverse consequences. The most visible ef- 
fects appeared in the financial outflow, exchange rate depreciation, and 
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the sharp drop in exports and industrial production. However, the effect 
of the shock was cushioned by macroeconomic policy levers. Fiscal stimu- 
lus was provided on the order of 4 percentage points of GDP, together 
with several emergency measures to provide domestic liquidity. 
On the monetary policy end, the policy rate was lowered, in sharp con- 
trast to the Asian crisis when the interest rate was initially raised to a 
stratospheric level to ward off a collapse in the external balance of pay- 
ments. Additionally, a high level of reserves made it possible for the 
central bank to provide liquidity to foreign exchange markets (around 
30 billion dollars in 2008). Swap lines with the U.S. FRB, China, and 
Japan have also helped restore stability to the foreign exchange market.5
B. Challenges ― Volatility in Financial Flows 
Although proactive policy responses helped limit the net economic 
impact, the 2008 crisis posed several questions. Could the vulnerability 
of the Korean economy to external shocks have been limited further? 
Could the effect of external shocks have been mitigated more effectively? 
Should the stock of international reserves have been larger? 
The external borrowing of the banking sector was a critical source of 
vulnerability. Kim (2009) reported the build-up of currency mismatch in 
the short-term external asset and liability of the banking sector. The 
banking sector’s net short-term external liability started at a relatively 
modest 30 billion dollars in 2005, but widened to 120 billion dollars by 
early 2008. The expansion of the overall balance sheet―despite the same 
rate of increase on the asset and liability sides― increased the absolute 
size of mismatch. 
Short-term currency mismatch on the external balance sheet results 
from the maturity and currency transformations of the financial sector. 
Maturity transformation is a core function of the financial sector, domes- 
tically or internationally, and currency transformation is an integral part 
of financial intermediation in the internationalized financial market. Both 
of them entail externality, however, and can trigger a run on the finan- 
cial system. Such a run visited upon Korea in the 2008 crisis, although 
briefly.
5 See Blanchard et al. (2010) for a discussion of policy responses in emerging 
markets during the Great Recession, including several case studies. Moreover, 
de Carvalho Filho (2010) finds that inflation-targeting countries provided greater 
monetary policy support during the Great Recession.
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A few remedies for this vulnerability can be considered.6
∙A sufficiently high level of reserves can enable the central bank to 
offset the effect of capital outflow, and ward off confidence crisis. 
Following the Asian crisis, many emerging market countries accu- 
mulated high level of reserves, beyond the levels often seen before 
the Asian crisis. The motive behind this has been debated, and it 
may have been the outcome of mixed motives and circumstances 
rather than being the outcome of a monolithic objective. 
  Nevertheless, there is sufficient ground for advocating the insurance 
benefit of accumulating reserves, in the context of open capital mar- 
kets (Aizenman and Lee 2007). It is much more contentious to quan- 
tify the benefit of accumulating reserves, and the so-called Feldstein- 
Guidotti rule has been a popular benchmark. The most expansive 
view has been advanced by Obstfeld et al. (2010), who viewed the 
demand for reserves to originate from the need to ensure financial 
stability, identifying the M2 as the main determinant of the neces- 
sary size of insurance. One implication of this view is that the bullet- 
proof level of international reserves will be equivalent to the stock 
of M2, which exceeds 100 percent of GDP in many countries. This 
is probably a very inefficient way of managing a system of flexible 
exchange rates, and begs for a more efficient arrangement, be it 
private or public.7
∙A sufficiently deep FX market can better absorb the effect of capital 
flow volatility (Kim and Suh 2010). Moreover, it is eventually a better 
way to respond to capital flow volatility, for the continued public 
supply of international liquidity (e.g., by the central bank) will weak- 
en the private sector incentive for managing international liquidity 
risks. The difficulty lies in its implementation. It is something which 
a country can try to promote, but not an outcome that a country 
can produce by fiat. A revealed demand for different currencies can 
6 We discuss policy measures that can be adopted by a country unilaterally, 
this being a paper on the BOK’s policy. We thus shy away from expressing our 
views on multilateral solutions, which are better discussed in terms of the inter- 
national financial architecture; only note here that multilateral solutions will 
have implications on the policy options and tradeoffs of each country.
7 Inefficiency of reserve accumulation as insurance device has been discussed 
in Caballero and Panageas (2005), and Lee (2004 and 2009b). See the Mundell 
Fleming Lecture by Caballero (2010) for an ambitious proposal to improve upon 
the current state of affairs.
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be seen in the COFER database of the IMF―although this refers to 
public sector demands, there will be some correlation between public 
and private demands for currencies. Despite significant changes in 
the global economic landscape over the past several decades, the 
relative demand for core reserve currencies has been remarkably 
stable. This indicates that, despite the long-term benefit of deep- 
ening foreign exchange market of a currency, the process will be 
very gradual at best. 
∙Regulations or controls on financial market play an indispensable 
role in ensuring financial and macroeconomic stability. Following the 
crisis, there is probably greater consensus on the need for pruden- 
tial regulation, in a form that is more comprehensive than was often 
deemed desirable before the crisis. Most relevant for our discussion 
is the international aspect of prudential regulation, and whether it 
will entail measures that can limit the adverse consequence of vola- 
tility in international financial flows. 
  A strong case for the prudential regulation that covers both domestic 
and international dimensions can be found in the common charac- 
teristics of many financial crises [see Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), 
for example ]. When the prudential regulation is recommended for 
crisis-prone financial systems, the same principle will call for ap- 
plying certain regulations to the international financial flows, which 
tend to trigger crises that share similar characteristics as typical fi- 
nancial crises. Nevertheless, there is a large gray area between pru- 
dential regulation and outright capital controls. There is also no 
consensus on the efficacy of capital controls, as exemplified by the 
debate on the effects of Chile’s capital controls. [See Ostry et al. 
(2010) for extensive discussion of capital controls.] 
In practice, policy makers probably have no alternative to adopting a 
heterodox approach. Many of the considerable measures take a long time, 
or are the second-best measures that are recommended in the face of 
financial market frictions, which weigh particularly heavily on the more 
advanced emerging market economies. Thus, the policy response in this 
situation may be viewed as a matter of managing the transition toward 
a more developed financial market, namely, while the act of “emerging” 
continues. The end goal would be to outgrow the need for many of these 
intermediate tools, but along the way, the heavy responsibility falls on the 
shoulders of policy makers.  
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VIII. Conclusion
The history of Korean monetary policy provides a testimony to the vari- 
ous roles that a central bank can play in an economy with evolving eco- 
nomic conditions. The history offers lessons not only for its macroeco- 
nomic role, but also for the politico-economic interactions among different 
agents in the economy. We emphasize the former aspect by invoking 
several simple macroeconomic frameworks, with a view toward comple- 
menting the analysis of the latter aspect that has been carried out in 
several existing studies. 
The challenge for the future will be to reconcile the proven track record 
of inflation targeting with the need to cope with continuing changes 
and evolutions in the financial market, both domestically and interna- 
tionally. In particular, no universal best practice is available on monetary 
policy in the face of volatility in asset prices and international capital 
flows. The story of the first 60 years suggests that this challenge will be 
met well by the Bank of Korea, which now enters its next 60 years.
(Received 27 September 2010; Revised 10 November 2010; Accepted 11 
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